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ABSTRACT 
This research will be focused on discovering patterns of activity that lead to the 
emplacement of IEDs by terrorists in urban environments.  This research will employ a 
network in a predictive mode by looking for suspicious activity patterns and raising alerts 
when a pre-determined level of confidence is achieved in the prediction. 
The scope of this thesis will be to conduct various experiments using wireless 
sensor network motes to detect the presence of magnetic material.  Using various 
configurations of the motes, a pattern will be established that best predicts the presence of 
IEDs in a busy urban environment.  The configurations will be designed and tested for 
reliability and coverage to support detection in various urban settings.   
The results show that wireless sensor networks in conjunction with other anti-IED 
methods prove useful for the detection of IED material in urban settings.  A wireless 
sensor network configured with proper equipment provides useful results for detecting 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE (IED) THREATS 
An Improvised Explosive Device (IED) is defined as “a device placed or 
fabricated in an improvised manner incorporating destructive, lethal, noxious, 
pyrotechnic, or incendiary chemicals and designed to destroy, incapacitate, harass, or 
distract.”1  These rudimentary bombs generally consist of commonly found, non-military 
materials.  
Improvised Explosive Devices have existed since the Chicago Haymarket Riot in 
1886.  However, IEDs currently provide the largest obstacle to coalition forces fighting in 
the Middle East.  Terrorists construct these small devices and inflict grave damage upon 
military equipment and personnel.  American casualties are not immune to the effects of 
IEDs.  IED attacks account for over 60% of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) casualties 
and 50% of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) casualties.2  The first reported IED 
attack on American forces in Iraq occurred on March 29, 2003.3  Since that first Iraqi 
attack, there have been over 81,000 IED attacks and over 25,000 in IED attacks in 2007 
alone.4 
                                                 
1 “Counter-IED Technology.”  JIEDDO webpage.  
<https://www.jieddo.dod.mil/CIEDTECHNOLOGY/CIEDTECHHOME.ASPX>. 
2 Wilson, Clay.  “Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) in Iraq and Afghanistan: Effects and 
Countermeasures.”  CRS Report for Congress 28 July 2007. p. 1. 
3 Atkinson, Rick. “The single most effective weapon against our deployed forces” The Washington 





Figure 1.   Coalition Forces IED Fatalities (From icasualties.org, September 2008) 
Insurgent cells constructing IEDs are small, highly trained groups that remain as 
hidden as possible.  The IED groups consist of six to eight people, including a financier, 
bomb maker, emplacer, triggerman, spotter, and cameraman.5  Despite US-led efforts to 
find these cells, new cells repeatedly form in Iraq.  Estimates include 160 bomb-making 
cells in Iraq. 
Although common IED threats include roadside bombs, suicide bombers are 
another emerging problem in the IED arena.  Suicide bombers carrying Personal-borne 
IEDs (PBIEDs) are extremely hard to detect or stop.  Because no IED emplacement is 
necessary, a suicide bomber can quickly strap on an IED-laden vest and move to the kill 
zone.  Placed in the proper urban environment, this weapon is capable of inflicting 
serious structural damage and killing hundreds of people in mere seconds. 
B. AMERICAN RESPONSE 
As America attempts to counter the IED problem, bomb makers continually 
improve their construction techniques.  Each new IED is increasingly more advanced and 
 
                                                 
5 Wilson, Clay.  “Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) in Iraq and Afghanistan: Effects and 
Countermeasures.”  CRS Report for Congress 28 July 2007. p. 2. 
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sophisticated then its previous version.  Each time an effective solution is found, bomb-
making cells react with a counterstrike solution.  The constant game of cat and mouse has 
proved difficult for American forces fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan.   
The six principal detonation triggers are pressure plates, cell phones, command 
wire, low-power radio-controlled, high-powered radio-controlled, and passive infrared.6  
At first, most IEDs employed the cell phone and radio triggers.  America responded by 
rapidly deploying electronic countermeasures or “jamming” techniques.  Employing 
jammers in the field effectively reduced the radio-controlled IEDs to less than 10 percent 
of the IEDs.  The terrorists responded by employing the simpler pressure plate and 
command wire models.  However, the bomb makers developed the more advanced 
passive infrared trigger.  These triggers were immune to most American electronic 
countermeasures techniques employed to stop cell phone and radio-controlled attacks.  
The small lens used for the passive infrared detector was extremely difficult to see or 
locate.7 
The US also provided heavier armor for its convoy vehicles.  Once again, the 
bomb makers found a counter-solution.  Newer IED designs include explosively formed 
projectiles (EFPs) that penetrate vehicle armor. 
In addition to IED cell ingenuity, nation-states like Iran reportedly support the 
insurgencies by funding IED technology advancement.  State-sponsored funding 
exponentially increases the effectiveness of new IEDs and is the source of EFP material 
used against coalition forces.    
The need for effective IED countermeasures led the America to form the Army 
IED Task Force in October 2003, which was later transformed into the Joint IED Task 
Force.  The Joint IED Task Force was officially deemed the Joint IED Defeat 
Organization (JIEDDO) in February 2006 under Department of Defense (DOD) Directive 
                                                 
6 Wilson, Clay.  “Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) in Iraq and Afghanistan: Effects and 
Countermeasures.”  CRS Report for Congress 28 July 2007. p. 2. 
7 Atkinson, Rick.  “If you don’t go after the network, you’re never going to stop these guys.  Never.”  
The Washington Post 3 October 2007.  <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/10/02/AR2007100202366.html>. 
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2000.19E.  The purpose of JIEDDO is to mitigate the IED problem by attacking the 
threat, increasing IED research, and training the DOD in IED matters.  JIEDDO is split 
among three Lines of Operation including:  1) attack the network, 2) defeat the device 
and, 3) train the force.  The organization has spent $375 million countering the IED 
problem since 2003.8 
C. THESIS SCOPE 
 The work in this thesis concentrates on detection of magnetic materials used in 
IEDs in urban environments using a wireless sensor network.  Using the magnetic 
detectors in the wireless sensor nodes, magnetic behaviors and patterns are analyzed to 
differentiate a person carrying an IED and a person possessing magnetic material like 
jewelry or key chains.  Using wireless sensor nodes instead of standard metal detectors 
enables the detectors to remain hidden to outside observers.  The small nodes easily blend 
into the indigenous environmental settings to provide stealth. 
Differing wireless sensor network configurations were tested and analyzed to 
discover an optimal wireless sensor network topology solution for detecting patterns of 
IED behavior consistent with that of personal-borne IEDs (PBIEDs).  Specifically, the 
thesis work analyzed magnetic detection of IED material through a building entrance or 
doorway in a busy urban setting.  The thesis experimentation and conclusions determined 
the feasibility of using wireless sensor networks for IED detection and countermeasures 
in an urban environment. 
D. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
This thesis is broken into five chapters.  The first chapter introduces the growing 
IED problem American troops face in Iraq.  The second chapter analyzes the components 
and structure of an IED and shows various countermeasures the United States has 
undergone to lessen the effects of IEDs.  Chapter III gives a basic introduction to wireless 
sensor networks and its applicability in solving various problems.  Chapter IV reviews 
                                                 
8 Chisolm, Patrick.  “Clearing the Roads.”  Special Operations Technology Online Edition. 2 July 
2008.  <http://www.special-operations-technology.com/article.cfm?DocID=1129>. 
  5
the work and experiments conducted for solving magnetic detection of IED behavior in 
urban settings.  Chapter V presents the conclusions of the thesis experiments and 
proposes suggestions for future work in strengthening the use of wireless sensor networks 
for IED countermeasures. 
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II. IED COUNTERMEASURES 
A. IED COMPONENTS 
Every bomb maker has a unique signature for each IED created.  However, there 
are five common components in IEDs that are necessary to inflict maximal damage with 
minimal assembly. 
1. Power Source 
All IEDs require a power source to initiate the weapon.  Most initiators are battery 
operated electrical devices, but there are other means of initiation.  Spring-loaded 
initiators require no electrical power source to function.9 
 
 
Figure 2.   IED power source (From longwarjournal.org, September 2008) 
                                                 
9 “Explosive Devices.”  Department of Homeland Security, Office of Domestic Preparedness 9 June 
2005.  p. 88. 
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2. Initiator/Detonator 
The IED initiator detonates the weapon and begins the bombing sequence.  
Common initiators are blasting caps and fuse igniters.  Electrical initiators can be 
triggered in various ways, including a button, radio frequency, optical, etc.10   
 
 
Figure 3.   IED blasting cap (From stresau.com, September 2008) 
3. Explosives 
Common explosive materials are TNT, potassium chlorate, triacetonetriperoxide, 
ammonium nitrate and aluminum powder, and urea nitrate.  These chemicals produce the 
explosive effect of the IED.11 
4. Switch 
The IED switch arms the weapon after the initiator sequence begins.  The switch 
could be an arming switch, fuse, or both for redundancy.  Once the IED is armed, the 
internal circuit is complete and detonation occurs shortly thereafter.12 
                                                 
10 “Explosive Devices.”  Department of Homeland Security, Office of Domestic Preparedness 9 June 
2005. p. 89. 
11 Ibid., p. 89. 
12 Ibid., p. 89. 
  9
 
Figure 4.   IED pressure switch (From eastarmy.nic.in, September 2008) 
5. Fragmentation and Shrapnel 
The explosive material in an IED is quite deadly, but the damaging effect is 
maximized by adding fragmentation and shrapnel to the weapon.  Standard materials are 
steel ball bearings, nails, staples, etc.13    
B. IED EXPLOSIVE MATERIALS 
1. Potassium Chlorate 
Potassium Chlorate is commonly found in fireworks and is easily obtainable.  The 
explosive looks like white crystals or powder and has 83% of TNT power.14 
2. Triacetonetriperoxide 
Triacetonetriperoxide (TATP) is the most common explosive used by Middle 
Eastern suicide bombers.  TATP consists of peroxide, sulfuric acid, and acetone.  The 
combination yields 88% of TNT explosive power.  TATP appears as a white powder 
similar to cocaine.15 
                                                 
13 “Explosive Devices.”  Department of Homeland Security, Office of Domestic Preparedness 9 June 
2005.  p. 89. 
14 Ibid., p. 86. 
15 Ibid., p. 87. 
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3. Ammonium nitrate and Aluminum Powder 
Both ammonium nitrate powder and aluminum powder are common hardware 
store materials that combine to yield a 75% explosive effect to that of TNT.  Ammonium 
nitrate is commonly found in fertilizer, while aluminum powder is simply aluminum 
metal ground into a powder.16 
4. Urea Nitrate 
Urea nitrate consists of nitric acid and urea.  Nitric acid is one of the most 
commonly produced chemicals worldwide and can be found in most fertilizers.  Urea is 
also easily obtainable from many forms, including concentrated urine.  This combination 
yields a 75% TNT explosive effect.17 
C. IED TYPES 
1. Packaged IED 
Packaged IEDs are the standard homemade bomb used by Iraqi insurgents.  
Although variable in size, they are generally small enough to be carried by one person.  
These types of IEDs can be buried underground, placed in trashcans, or even thrown at 
their intended target.  Packaged IEDs usually contain military munitions as its explosive 
component.18 
 
                                                 
16 “Explosive Devices.”  Department of Homeland Security, Office of Domestic Preparedness 9 June 
2005. p. 87. 
17 Ibid., p. 88. 




Figure 5.   Packaged IED in concrete casing (From GlobalSecurity.org, September 2008) 
 
2. Vehicular-borne IEDs (VBIEDs) 
Vehicular-borne IEDS (VBIEDs) are bombs constructed with a vehicle as the 
delivery device.  Much larger than the packaged IEDs, VBIEDS contain more explosive 
material and are more lethal than typical IEDs.19   
 
 
                                                 




Table 1.   VBIED Explosive effect (From GlobalSecurity.org, September 2008) 
 
3. Personal-borne IEDs (PBIEDs) 
The personal-borne IED (PBIED) is the suicide bomber with explosives strapped 
to the body.  The PBIED is often well concealed on the body and difficult to detect 
without personal inspection.  Suicide bombers are highly mobile and inflict maximal 
damage in crowded urban areas.  Since the suicide bomber dies upon PBIED detonation, 





Figure 6.   Actual PBIED vest used by Sri Lankan terrorist (From Asian Tribune, 
September 2008) 
D. METHODS OF DETECTION 
There are many methods currently being employed in the hunt for IEDs in Iraq.  
JIEDDO has increasingly stepped up its efforts in combating the problem, but the issue 
still plagues American troops.  Bomb makers consistently deliver bomb solutions that 
thwart American anti-IED efforts. 
1. Electromagnetic Energy 
One of the first American solutions was to detect the frequency spectrum used by 
the IED initiator devices.  By correctly analyzing the frequency spectrum used by the 
remote triggers, troops successfully jammed the frequencies and prevented IEDs from 
being triggered.  Electromagnetic pulse jamming also destroyed IED circuitry.  Warlock 
Blue is a small, portable jamming device carried by troops into the battlefield.  Produced 
by Tyco, the device specifically targets the IED triggering mechanisms.20 
                                                 
20 Mortenson, Darrin.  “Electronic 'IED' jammers roll out to stymie bombers.”  North County Times 10 
July 2005.  <http://www.globalsecurity.org/org/news/2005/050710-ied-jammers.htm>. 
  14
2. Change Detection 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) use mounted cameras to take pictures of 
probable IED areas and then come back for more images.  The Buckeye camera mounted 
on a UAV uses an electro-optical sensor capable of producing three-dimensional images.  
Using imagery software or the human eye, the Buckeye pictures are analyzed against 
pictures from the same area, but taken at a different time.  Scrutinizing the images to the 
nearest pixel, experts can determine if suspicious IED activity has occurred in a region.  
The Army’s Shadow UAV Detection System also employs cameras for change detection.  
Another system, the ULTOR (Ultra Lethal Targeting by Optical Recognition) high-speed 
optical processor recognizes IEDs and employs precision tracking for vehicles.  The 
ULTOR system uses the Internet, allowing it to be used anywhere in the world.21 
Many different tools and technologies analyze images for change detection.  
Image analysis is currently one of the most successful methods currently in use for 
countering insurgent IEDs.  Research in change detection has extended to many 
battlefield applications and is another resource used for IED countermeasures. 
 
 
Figure 7.   ULTOR processor (From aos-inc.com, September 2008) 
                                                 
21 Farr, Keith.  “ULTOR:  Ultra Lethal Targeting by Optical Recognition.”  Advanced Optical 
Systems, Inc.  2006.  <http://www.aos-inc.com/research/TechBriefPDFs/ULTORTechBrief.pdf >. 
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3. Chemical 
Many studies test the chemical properties of IED materials and the surrounding 
environment of IED emplacement.  The BAE Talon Radiance II hyperspectral sensor 
system in conjunction with the Shadow UAV uses hyperspectral sensing to identify 
materials.22  Hyperspectral sensing, or imaging spectroscopy, identifies materials and 
elements by measuring chemical bonds within the material.23  Raman spectroscopy is 
another method used to detect IED material.  Raman spectroscopy measures the 
wavelength and intensity of inelastic scattered light and provides molecular information 
about a material24.  A study conducted by the New Mexico Institute of Mining and 
Technology from 2004-06 measured soil moisture content and other environmental soil 
properties to find buried IEDs25.  Although the study was inconclusive for real world IED 
emplacement, it showed a promising area for further research. 
 
Figure 8.   Hyperspectral Sensor (From ifac.cnr.it, September 2008) 
                                                 
22 Chisolm, Patrick.  “Clearing the Roads.”  Special Operations Technology Online Edition.  2 July 
2008.  <http://www.special-operations-technology.com/article.cfm?DocID=1129>. 
23 Clark, Roger. “About Imaging Spectroscopy.”  US Geological Survey 25 September 2002.  
<http://speclab.cr.usgs.gov/aboutimsp.html>. 
24 Tissue, Brian. “Raman Spectroscopy.”  Science Hypermedia Home Page 24 February 1996.  
<http://elchem.kaist.ac.kr/vt/chem-ed/spec/vib/raman.htm>. 
25 Hendrickx et al. “New Mexico Tech Landmine, UXO, IED Detection Sensor Test Facility:  
Measurement in Real Field Soils.”  New Mexico Institute of Mining and Technology 27 April 2006. p. 1.  
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The Idaho National Laboratory developed the Idaho Explosives Detection System 
using pulsed thermal neutron generation.  This method changes the molecular material 
structure to emit gamma rays.  The gamma rays are then analyzed by sodium-ion 
detectors to identify nitrogen-based explosives.  Nitrogen is found in over 98% of all 
explosives.26  This exciting technology provides solutions to many military problems, 
especially IED issues. 
 
 
Figure 9.   Idaho Explosives Detection System in use (From inl.gov, September 2008) 
4. Other Solutions 
Many organizations are working on anti-IED technology in coordination with 
JIEDDO.  All Optronics Inc. proposes to pre-treat areas with fluorescent material and 
then use optical imaging to detect and analyze changes within the treated areas.27  The 
DOD Sensor Countermeasures for the Future Force program will investigate solutions 
involving airborne sensors, communications, and battlefield surveillance radar.28 
                                                 
26 Huffman, Ethan.  “INL’s Explosive Detection System to be installed at US Air Base.”  Idaho 
National Laboratory 21 November 2006.  <http://www.inl.gov/featurestories/2006-11-21.shtml>. 
27 Chisolm, Patrick.  “Clearing the Roads.”  Special Operations Technology Online Edition.  2 July 
2008.  <http://www.special-operations-technology.com/article.cfm?DocID=1129>. 
28 Chisolm, Patrick.  “Clearing the Roads.”  Special Operations Technology Online Edition.  2 July 
2008.  <http://www.special-operations-technology.com/article.cfm?DocID=1129>. 
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Magnetic sensors used to detect metallic IED materials are being developed for 
use in the battlefield.  The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has 
developed a tiny magnetometer requiring very little power to operate.29 
 
 
Figure 10.   NIST Magnetometer (From physorg.com, September 2008) 
 
Through a cooperative effort among the numerous government contractors, a 
wealth of IED solutions is being investigated.  Research is being conducted in analyzing 
all aspects of an IED from its physical and chemical composition all the way to the bomb 
maker.  As solutions arise, America must be able to attack counter-solutions of the bomb 
makers. 
E. SUMMARY 
There are countless numbers of IED countermeasures solutions currently being 
researched, developed, and analyzed by US contracting organizations and JIEDDO.  Each 
solution must accurately react to past IED problems and predict future IED scenarios.  
Predicting future IED weapons and detonation methods is an exhaustive challenge that is 
nearly impossible to solve.  As bomb makers continually develop solutions to American 
                                                 
29 Bourzac, Katherine. “Tiny, Sensitive Magnetic-Field Detectors: Arrays of cheap magnetic sensors 
could detect improvised explosive devices.”  Technology Review, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
16 November 2007.  <http://www.technologyreview.com/Biotech/19724/>. 
  18
countermeasures, the challenge is to keep up.  Simple reaction to past IED scenarios 
merely provides a temporary Band-Aid that does not fully address the IED problem.  As 
different solutions are analyzed, each must have the larger scope picture in mind, yet still 
be detailed enough to solve its individual piece of the IED puzzle. 
This thesis uses wireless sensor network technology to counter personal-borne 
IEDs in urban environments.  The next chapter provides a brief description of wireless 
sensor networking, its uses, and its applicability to an IED solution. 
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III. WIRELESS SENSOR NETWORKS FOR IED DETECTION 
A. OVERVIEW 
1. Background 
A wireless sensor network (WSN) is formed from a series of wireless network 
nodes or motes, generally in an ad-hoc network configuration.  Each node contains a 
small processor to handle sensing duties.  Nodes are able to relay information using a pre-
determined routing protocol such as ZigBee.  The ZigBee protocol follows the IEEE 
802.15.4 standard for wireless personal area networks employing low data rates and low 
power requirements.  Due to the wireless constraint, each WSN node needs a self-
contained power source such as batteries.  Batteries make each mote power-limited and 
unable to sustain continuous long-term operations.  Due to small power availability, 
nodes are constrained in processing and signaling capability.  Many nodes have a “sleep” 
capability that allow the nodes to shut down their internal processors when not in use and 
increase battery life.  Wireless sensor nodes possess sensing capabilities such as 
magnetic, passive infrared, acoustic, or etc.  A series of cooperative wireless nodes with 
sensing capabilities results in a wireless sensor network. 
A standard WSN uses the nodes for their physical sensing capabilities in 
conjunction with a special node called a base station.  Although it is possible for the base 
station to be a node within the network, this is an unlikely situation.  The base station 
receives information from the nodes and passes it to another source to process the data.  
Since the base station receives input from the WSN nodes, it has higher power 
requirements and must always coordinate data delivery out of the network. 
2. Applications 
Wireless sensor networks posses many useful real-world applications.  Examples 
that WSN uses include: 
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• Environmental monitoring 
• Industrial sensing and diagnostics 
• Infrastructure protection 
• Battlefield awareness 
• Context-aware computing30 
Wireless sensor network applications cover a broad spectrum from civilian to 
military use.  Pickberry Vineyards in Sonoma County, CA employs a WSN measuring 
temperature, humidity, and soil moisture.31  Using the WSN allows the vineyard to 
accurately predict grape growth and properly apply changes necessary in producing 
premium wine.  Researchers from the University of California, Berkeley setup a WSN on 
Great Duck Island, Maine to study the environment of the Leach’s Storm Petrel bird.32  
The practical applications of wireless sensor are endless, while WSN usage increasingly 
becomes commonplace even in the most unexpected places. 
3. Basic Setup 
A standard wireless sensor network configuration involves several wireless nodes 
and a base station.  Each node contains sensing capabilities appropriate for the network 
application and needs.  Nodes cannot process or analyze the information, but can forward 
information to either another node or the base station.  The base station can be a specially 
designated node in the network or a completely separate entity.  The base station then 
transmits received information to a network, computer, or transceiver capable of 
analyzing and processing information received from the WSN.   
 
                                                 
30 Zhao, Feng and Guibas, Leonidas.  Wireless Sensor Network: An Information Processing 
Approach.  Morgan Kaufmann Publishers, San Francisco, CA 2004.  pp. 9-10. 
31 Collins, Michael.  “Wireless Sensor Network Helps Grower Produce Better Grapes.”  BBC News 
Online 6 July 2004.  <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/3860863.stm>. 
32 Mainwaring et al.  “Wireless Sensor Networks for Habitat Monitoring.”  WSNA ’02, Atlanta, GA 







Figure 11.   WSN data flow example 
B. CROSSBOW MSP410 
Many companies such as Crossbow, Ember, and Texas Instruments produce 
wireless sensor network components and solutions.  Crossbow is a company specializing 
in inertial systems and wireless sensor network solutions.  This thesis uses the Crossbow 
MSP410 wireless security system for implementing a WSN solution.  The MSP410 
package employs sensors used in various wireless intrusion detection systems and 
deploys as part of a robust mesh network of multi-purpose mote protection modules. 
The MSP410 system consists of battery-powered motes housing a 433 MHz 
processor with magnetic, passive infrared, and acoustic detection capability.  The system 
also uses a base station module to allow the sensor network data onto a personal 




Figure 12.   Crossbow MSP410 mote (From xbow.com, September 2008) 
 
 
Figure 13.   Inner processor and detectors of MSP410 mote (From xbow.com, September 
2008) 
 
Figure 14.   MSP410 Base Station (From xbow.com, September 2008) 
The mesh-networking feature of the motes allows motes to communicate with 
each mote in the network.  Additional motes can be added to the network or motes can be 
removed from the network seamlessly.  The magnetic detection capability within the 
motes uses a two-axis magnetic field sensor to detect electronic voltage perturbations 
around the sensor.  The passive infrared sensors detect dynamic changes in the thermal 
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radiation environment within immediate vicinity of the sensor.  The mote also contains a 
dormant microphone to detect acoustic changes within its environment.  Each mote 
contains four magnetic and passive infrared sensors placed within a cubicle housing to 
provide nearly 360-degree coverage. 
 
Table 2.   MSP410 Specifications (From xbow.com, September 2008) 
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C. WSN AS AN IED COUNTERMEASURE 
Wireless sensor networking is an emerging technology rapidly incorporating itself 
into real world applications.  The use of inconspicuous motes detecting physical 
properties information make it a natural fit for analyzing an IED urban scenario.  WSN 
motes can be configured to detect numerous properties necessary for its usage purpose.  
Placing a WSN by entry and exit points of urban buildings provides a stealthy means of 
detecting IED materials.  The accuracy of the mote detectors allows observers to 
distinguish normal routines from suspicious IED activities.  The WSN can be setup to 
alert security officials of possible IED activity and used in conjunction with standard 
surveillance methods to provide a more complete and accurate depiction of actual 
activities taking place in real-time.      
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IV. WIRELESS SENSOR NETWORK CONFIGURATIONS AND 
EXPERIMENTS 
A. FOCUS OF RESEARCH 
The focus of this research is to find patterns of activity that lead to the discovery 
of IEDs by terrorists in urban environments. Urban settings include places of worship, 
shopping malls, offices, etc.  The experiments concentrate upon detection of personal-
borne IEDs (PBIEDs). 
This research concentrates on employing a wireless sensor network (WSN) to 
provide a low power, easily deployable, and adaptable solution to detect IEDs.  These 
characteristics of WSNs make it a possible solution in combating the IED problem.  The 
network will work in a predictive mode by looking for patterns of activity that appear 
suspicious and raising alerts when a certain level of confidence has been achieved in the 
prediction. 
Using wireless sensor motes to form a WSN, this research experiments with 
different mote configurations and various tests to discover new methods of detecting 
IEDs.  There are many different types of sensing modalities used to detect suspicious IED 
behavior including passive infrared (PIR), magnetic, acoustic, seismic and chemical. 
This project concentrates on detecting magnetic signature patterns to predict IED 
presence in an urban environment. Ferrous materials compose a large number of IEDs, 
making magnetic sensors a logical choice for detecting IEDs.  However, magnetic 
sensors alone may not be sufficient in confirming IED presence.  Two different 
possibilities exist in this experiment.  The network may be susceptible to false positives 
(the network falsely detecting IEDs) or false negatives (failure of network to detect IED).  
Using a combination of different sensor modalities could mitigate false positives or false 
negatives.  Although this project only concentrated on magnetic signatures, other sensor 
modalities could provide the basis for future research. 
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The urban environment presents many challenges in this research.  Large crowds 
provide many variables unbeknownst to the planning process.  For example, the presence 
of a metal shopping cart in a grocery store is a common occurrence, thus another reason 
to use metallic sensors in conjunction with other detection characteristics.  Another issue 
is the emplacement of the wireless sensor nodes.  Although relatively small, they must be 
carefully placed to avoid accidental detection.  The experiments conducted in this project 
show characteristics and results of using the wireless sensor motes with magnetic 
detection capability. 
B. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The research consisted of several rounds of experiments using the Crossbow 
MSP410 wireless motes.  These motes possess passive infrared and magnetic detection 
capabilities.  All of the experiments made use of the MSP410 motes, 18” orange safety 
cones to elevate the motes from the ground, and steel buckets and staples to simulate 
metallic IED material.  The experiments are clustered into three types: configuration, 
initial, and optimal. 
1. Configuration Experiments 
The configuration experiments were designed to test the physical attributes, 
capabilities, and limitations of the Crossbow MSP410 motes.  The tests were created only 





Figure 15.   Configuration Experiment 1: Basic Setup 
 
Configuration experiment 1 kept the metal bucket in a fixed position and the mote 
was walked along a straight-line path over the bucket.  It was determined that the spacing 
was too great and the motes had trouble detecting magnetic material unless extremely 









Figure 16.   Configuration Experiment 2:  Horizontal Cone angle configuration setup 
 
Configuration experiment 2 tested for the cone angle of the mote.  Finding the 
cone angle helped determine the optimal configuration of mote placements in a wireless 
sensor network.  It was discovered that the mote had an 89-degree cone angle, giving the 










Figure 17.   Configuration Experiment 3:  Vertical Cone angle configuration setup 
 
Configuration experiment 3 placed the mote 1.5 feet away from a wall.  Metal 
was placed at varying heights of the wall to determine how high the metal could be 
detected by the sensor mote.  Results showed that a 2.5’ height was the maximum 















Figure 18.   Configuration Experiment 4:  Mote interval spacing setup 
 
The capability of mote magnetic detection capability as a function of distance was 
needed.  Configuration experiment 4 placed two motes at varying intervals to determine 
the maximum spacing between the motes that still allowed for detection of magnetic 
material.  This experiment showed that six feet spacing produced reliable and consistent 
results.  Later rounds of experiments show that eight feet spacing is acceptable for 
detection and still yields consistent results.  This means that metal detection is strong 


















Intervals between motes were 2 ft, 




Figure 20.   Configuration Experiment 6:  Mote 2 distance vs. strength of reading 
 
Configurations 5 and 6 tested whether the distance from the mote affected the 
strength of the magnetic readings.  It was determined that the motes did produce stronger 
magnetic readings at closer distances.  However, the mote’s magnetic reading quickly 















Figure 21.   Configuration Experiment 7:  Metal volume vs. strength of reading 
 


























Configuration experiment 7 was a tested if large amounts of metal at a specified 
distance would give the same magnetic reading as smaller amounts of metal at a closer 
distance.  It was found to be true.  The graph shows various metals placed at various 
distances from the mote.  A keychain placed 6 inches from the mote gave just as strong 
readings as a bucket placed 3 feet away from the mote. 
2. Initial Setup Experiments 
The initial setup experiments tested various configurations of a six mote wireless 
sensor network.  These initial experiments combined with the configuration experiments 
lead to designing an optimal configuration of six motes. 
 
 
Figure 23.   Initial Experiment 1:  six-mote configuration 
 
The first experiment used a basic rectangular configuration of motes placed at 
five-meter intervals as shown.  During this experiment, the steel bucket was traversed 

















in which ferrous material was unable to be detected.  It was determined that the motes 
were spaced too far apart causing the many “dead” spots in the configuration.  The 





Figure 24.   Initial Experiment 2:  Hexagon six-mote configuration 
Initial experiment 2 tested a hexagonal configuration of motes.  Mote spacing was 
set at five-meter intervals again.  The mote spacing was too great again.  Although 
magnetic readings were strong near the motes, the strength of readings quickly decreased 
with increased distance from the motes.  Various walking paths through the network were 













Hexagon Configuration 2 
5m 
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3. Optimal Configuration Experiments 
Through the configuration and initial setup experiments, the following design was 
found to be optimal for a six-mote wireless sensor network.  Motes one and five represent 
an entrance or doorway to an urban building.  The first experiments using the optimal 
configuration placed the motes at two feet intervals.  This interval was later increased to 
four feet, eight feet, and 12 feet.  Initial experiments used one subject carrying a metal 
bucket to traverse the network.  Final experiments were conducted with two and three 







































































Figure 28.   Optimal Experiment 6:  Optimal six-mote configuration with 12 feet intervals 
 
Initial experiments tested the two and four feet configurations as a means of 
providing network redundancy and avoiding blind spots inside the mote area.  The motes 
were able to detect strong magnetic signals from the bucket and provided many data 
points for detection by the mote software.  Saturation was a factor in these experiments. 
Later experiments expanded the mote intervals to eight and twelve feet.  The 
eight-foot configuration still provided reliable and consistent results.  The twelve-foot 
configuration showed some readings, but was not consistently able to detect metal from 
six feet away.  From several rounds of experiments, it was determined that an eight-foot 
interval between motes was optimal for the six-mote network.  This interval provided 
redundancy of motes while avoiding blind spots within the network.  However, this 





























































Figure 30.   Random subjects path in multi-person experiment 
Subsequent experiments increased the number of subjects traversing the network.  
The above graphs represent a singular experiment where one subject with a small amount 
of metal walked directly over motes one and two and another subject carrying a metal 
bucket walked a straight-line path between motes three, four, five, and six.  Both subjects 
showed strong readings, further demonstrating the effects of distance versus amount of 
metal. 
Final experiments used two or three subjects traveling the network.  A control subject 
carried a steel bucket along a pre-ordained path, while other subjects carried nominal 
amounts of metal to represent normal conditions like carrying key chains and jewelry.  Some 
experiments had the subjects walking in parallel.  Other experiments had the subjects 
traversing the networks in opposite directions.  Final experiments had subjects walking 
randomly through the network.  The experiments showed consistent results in that the steel 
bucket was always detectable.  Small amounts of metal were detected when subjects were in 
close proximity to the wireless mote.  Another factor tested for was walking pace.  Pace did 
not affect the strength of readings in the experiments. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS 
A. OVERALL IMPRESSIONS 
Overall, a wireless sensor network using only magnetic detection is not a 
complete and reliable solution for the IED problem.  The strengths of a WSN include low 
power requirements, adaptability, and relative ease of use.  Weaknesses include a lack of 
processing power, difficult software changes, and susceptibility to jamming. 
The MSP410 wireless motes were severely limited in their magnetic detection 
capability.  The motes work well when detecting large amounts of metals (i.e. cars) or 
metal at close distance (less than 12”).  At distances of less then 12”, the motes accurately 
detect small amounts of metal such as a cell phone or keychain, but this ability quickly 
tapers off outside of 18”.  The motes could reliably detect the five-gallon steel bucket 
weighing three pounds from 4 feet.  Distances greater then 4 feet did not provide reliable 
and consistent detection capability.  The inability of the motes to detect at greater 
distances makes the MSP410 equipment an expensive solution for urban environments.  
For controlling entrances to building such as shopping malls, places of worship or office 
buildings, a cost-effective WSN implementation would be possible. It will require 
designing and integrating a configuration that leaves no holes in detection and provides 
redundancy to prevent network failure.   
The wireless sensor network is extremely vulnerable to electromagnetic jamming.  
An attack could take place by first using a spectrum analyzer to determine the frequency 
of the mote communication.  A signal generator could then re-create the signal at the 
same frequency but at a higher power setting to jam the network.  One possible solution 
is to employ frequency hopping.  The SP410 motes do not support frequency hopping in 
their firmware. 
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B. FUTURE WORK SUGGESTIONS 
There are many suggestions for future work in this project.  First, the motes need 
to be able to sample at a higher rate to more accurately show readings compared to 
distance from the mote.  This might be achieved through a software fix or new wireless 
sensor mote equipment.  It is often impossible to tell whether a reading is a small amount 
of metal at close distance, or a larger amount of metal at an increased distance from the 
mote.  Other sensor capabilities can be tested with the motes.  Through infrared sensing, 
motes can measure magnetic readings in conjunction with infrared signatures.  This is 
one possible solution in distinguishing varying amounts of metal with respect to mote 
distance. 
Although many tests have been completed in the research reported here, more 
research and experimentation is needed.  The sensor network would be extremely 
successful in an urban environment if given a constant power source and an increased 
magnetic sampling rate.  In addition, activating additional sensor modalities should be 
tested to see if they could be used in conjunction with magnetic sensing to provide better 
results.  This would allow for a better depiction of patterns consistent with IED 
emplacement.  Through further testing, the sensor network can truly utilize its full 
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